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Current views about language are dominated by the idea of arbitrary connections between 
linguistic form and meaning. However, if we look beyond the more familiar Indo-European 
languages and also include both spoken and signed language modalities, we find that motivated, 
iconic form-meaning mappings are, in fact, pervasive in language. In this paper, we review the 
different types of iconic mappings that characterize languages in both modalities, including the 
predominantly visually iconic mappings found in signed languages. Having shown that iconic 
mapping are present across languages, we then proceed to review evidence showing that 
language users (signers and speakers) exploit iconicity in language processing and language 
acquisition. While not discounting the presence and importance of arbitrariness in language, we 
put forward the idea that iconicity need also be recognized as a general property of language, 
which may serve the function of reducing the gap between linguistic form and conceptual 
representation to allow the language system to "hook up” to motor, perceptual, and affective 
experience.
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ARBITRARINESS iN LANGUAGE: THE RECEiVED VIEW
The relation between words and real-world referents has intrigued 
scholars since antiquity. Early debates centered on the origin of 
words (as names for things), specifically, on the nature of their 
relation to the things they stand for. In Plato’s Cratylus, the oldest 
documented of these debates, Socrates is asked to contemplate the 
question of whether names belong to their objects “naturally” or 
“conventionally.” The latter of these two possibilities, namely that 
form and meaning are linked by convention and tradition alone, 
has come to dominate our modern thinking about language. Words, 
and more generally language as a symbolic system, are conceived 
of as being arbitrarily related to the world. At the lexical level, the 
phonological form of a linguistic sign is considered to have no 
relationship to its meaning.
The idea of an arbitrary connection between form and mean­
ing is generally associated with Saussure, but, in fact, John Locke 
established a firm foothold for the idea much earlier when he argued 
in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) that the exist­
ence of different languages (with very different words for the same 
objects) is evidence against a “natural” connection between form 
and meaning. Since everyone perceives the world in the same way, 
there should be only one human language if properties of objects 
could in any way (i.e., by “natural” connection) determine the 
names given them. The persuasive force of this argument, and its 
far-reaching impact, is not difficult to fathom.
Today, no one would subscribe to the idea of an actual “natural” 
connection between linguistic signs and their denotata. The idea 
that each object could have an inherently “correct” name known 
from the object itself strikes us as antiquated and arcane. Instead, 
the current mainstream view has embraced the polar opposite idea: 
namely that convention alone determines the relationship between
form and meaning. Indeed, if we look at the lexicon of English (or 
that of other Indo-European languages), we might be forgiven for 
thinking that there could be anything but a conventionally deter­
mined, arbitrary connection between a given word and its referent. 
For the vast majority of English words there is an arbitrary relation­
ship between form and meaning. There is nothing, for example, in 
the sequence of sounds represented by /haus/ that indicates that it 
refers to “a building for human habitation” (house) in English.
Language is understood to be a system of conventional symbols 
shared by a community of users. Users of English must agree about 
the meaning of /haus/, and this knowledge must be passed on from 
generation to generation. We can see the stamp of conventionaliza­
tion even in the case of onomatopoeia, i.e., words like buzz or meow, 
which imitate sounds in the real world (usually made by objects 
or animals). The English expression for the sound a rooster makes 
(cock-a-doodle-doo) is quite different from the German expres­
sion (kikiriki), which is different again from the French expression 
(cocorico), and all of which are arguably quite different from the 
actual sound which emerges from a rooster.
The evidence for conventionalized, arbitrary form-meaning 
mappings as defining our system of communication seems almost 
self-evident. Moreover, it is consistent with, and surely engendering 
of, the idea that language is a wholly symbolic system, the elements 
of which are manipulated on an abstract level of representation. It 
is this idea that defines and dominates current, received views about 
the acquisition, production, and comprehension of language, as, 
for example, in the strict modular separation of levels for lemma 
(semantic/grammatical representation) and lexeme (phonological 
representation) in some models of lexical retrieval and production 
(e.g., Garrett, 1984; Levelt, 1989; Levelt et al., 1999). According to 
these authors, not only are meaning and form represented and
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retrieved separately in production, but they are fully independent. 
Whereas the last 20 years have seen numerous debates concern­
ing the degree of interaction and overlap between semantic and 
syntactic processing in models of word and sentence comprehen­
sion, the question of whether and to what extent phonological and 
semantic representations overlap has received almost no attention. 
One need only read, for example, the opening paragraphs of the 
highly influential Behavioral and Brain Sciences article by Levelt 
et al. (1999) on speech production to realize just how fundamental 
the assumption of arbitrariness is in theories of language process­
ing. For Levelt et al. (1999), language acquisition and use is set into 
motion through the merging of two separate systems: “ [W]ord 
production emerges from a coupling of two initially independent 
systems, a conceptual system and an articulatory motor system. 
This duality is never lost in the further maturation of our word 
production system.” (p. 1).
This “major rift” in the system, as Levelt et al. (1999) call it, renders 
impossible the presence of anything like a “natural” connection, the 
more contemporary version of which we may frame in terms of 
iconicity or motivation, between form and meaning. In this paper, 
we argue that the preoccupation with arbitrariness in language has 
eclipsed a proper acknowledgment of non-arbitrary, i.e., iconic and 
motivated form-meaning mappings in language. When we widen the 
scope of linguistic inquiry to include larger expanses of the globe, 
beyond Indo-European languages (and thus more diverse linguis­
tic structures), as well as language in both modalities (spoken and 
signed), it is clear that many languages in fact make widespread and 
systematic use of non-arbitrary form-meaning mappings.
In the Section “Iconicity in Languages: Is it Really There?,” we 
show that regular correspondences between form and meaning 
exist across both spoken and signed language modalities, motivated 
by perceptuo-motor properties of real-world experiences. We use 
iconicity as a blanket term for a broad range of phenomena, includ­
ing what has been referred to in the literature as sound-symbolism, 
mimetics, ideophones, and iconicity. It is our view that these different 
phenomena (discussed below), while varying in amount and degree, 
all have in common some non-arbitrary, iconic mapping between 
form and meaning. In providing a comprehensive overview of the 
presence of iconicity in language, we challenge the received view 
that language is fundamentally arbitrary in nature: a view which is 
dismissive of iconic form-meaning mappings as being negligible in 
quantity and linguistically inferior in quality. After demonstrating the 
presence and availability of iconic mappings in language, we go on in 
the Section “Are we Sensitive to Iconicity?” to review research findings 
that indicate that iconicity has a role to play in processing. The findings 
show that language users are in fact sensitive to iconicity, suggesting 
that iconic, motivated mappings influence language processing in a 
way that calls into question the deep “rift” between levels of form and 
meaning. We further discuss the possible role that iconicity may play 
in lexical acquisition. Finally, in the “General Discussion,” we discuss 
the implications of considering iconicity, and not only arbitrariness, 
as a ubiquitous, fundamental feature of language.
ICONICITY IN LANGUAGES: IS IT REALLY THERE?
Far from constituting a “vanishingly small” proportion of words 
in any given language (Newmeyer, 1992), iconic mappings can be 
observed both at the lexical and structural level across modalities,
and, importantly, these mappings can be considered to be a general 
property of languages. For example, well documented is the iconic­
ity of onomatopoeia (the group of words referred to by Newmeyer). 
Moreover, iconicity in the structure of sentences (reflected in mor- 
phosyntax and especially word order) is also well acknowledged 
in the literature (Haiman, 1980, 1985; Givón, 1985; Berlin, 1994; 
Croft, 2003). Here, as Croft (2003, p. 102) puts it, we find that 
“the structure of language reflects in some way the structure of 
experience.” Examples of such iconicity include that of sequence, 
contiguity, repetition, quantity, complexity, and cohesion (see 
also Greenberg, 1963; Haiman, 1980; Croft, 1990; Givón, 1991; 
Newmeyer, 1992; Levinson, 2000). For example, the principle 
of “iconicity of sequence” (or “sequential order”) holds that the 
sequence of forms conforms to the sequence of experience, as in 
the famous collocation veni, vidi, vici. The principle of “iconicity 
of contiguity” (or “linguistic proximity”) assumes that forms that 
belong together semantically will occur closer together morpho- 
syntactically than forms that are semantically unrelated (cf. Bybee, 
1985). While this type of iconicity has been investigated primarily 
for spoken languages, and hardly at all for signed languages, we 
may assume that similar kinds of structural iconicity influence 
syntagmatic relations in both language modalities.
At the lexical level, however, iconicity in spoken languages has 
hardly been acknowledged beyond onomatopoetic words, in line 
with the received view that arbitrariness governs the lexical inter­
face between meaning and form in language (the rift mentioned 
above). The situation is different for signed languages, where the 
existence of iconic links between form and meaning cannot escape 
the eye. Nonetheless, guided by the assumptions of the received 
view, the role of iconicity has been downplayed. Below we review 
the literature for spoken and signed languages separately.
ICONICITY IN SPOKEN LANGUAGES
In spoken languages, depictive forms that make use of iconic map­
pings were described as early as the seventeenth century, and noted 
in more earnest in grammars (e.g., of African languages) dating 
to the middle of the nineteenth century (Dingemanse, in press). 
However, their seemingly idiosyncratic forms and behavior, as well 
as their depictive and expressive properties defied standard linguis­
tic description. Within current theoretical perspectives, iconicity 
is mostly ignored, based mainly on the argument that iconicity in 
spoken language is only observed for a small number of words. 
Indeed, direct imitative form-meaning mappings in spoken lan­
guages are only possible for acoustic properties and events, which 
are arguably far less frequent than visual properties and events in 
our experience. Thus, onomatopoetic words make up only a small 
portion of spoken languages’ total lexica, although they appear 
consistently across all spoken languages.
The sounds imitated in onomatopoeia are typically animal 
sounds (meow, moo, oink) or the sounds made by objects in motion 
or upon impact on other objects (whoosh, swish, whack, crack, crash, 
bang). Some of these words (particularly those referring to object 
motion and impact) also exhibit another type of iconic mapping 
called phonesthesia. In phonesthemes, a similarity of form, typically 
in word-initial or word-final consonant clusters, is correlated with 
a similarity of meaning. For example, in English, words ending 
in -ack, as in whack and crack above, denote forceful, punctuated
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contact, while words beginning with gl- (as in gleam, glow, glint, 
glitter) denote a meaning related to light of low intensity, and words 
beginning with wr- (as in writhe, wriggle, wrist, write) refer to 
twisting (see Firth, 1930 for many more examples). As the overlap 
between some of these onomatopoetic and phonesthemic forms 
indicates, the presence of phonethesia in language may in part be 
the result of generalization from acoustically iconic form-meaning 
mappings.
The “small inventory” argument for iconic forms in spoken 
languages may hold for most Indo-European languages, and has 
likely been expanded to language on the whole as a consequence 
of a Euro-centric linguistic perspective. When we move outside the 
Indo-European language family, however, we find that iconic map­
pings are prevalent and are used to express sensory experiences of 
all kinds. Languages for which a large iconic, or sound-symbolic, 
lexicon has been reported include virtually all sub-Saharan African 
languages (Childs, 1994), some of the Australian Aboriginal lan­
guages (Alpher, 2001; McGregor, 2001; Schultze-Berndt, 2001), 
Japanese, Korean, Southeast Asian languages (Diffloth, 1972; 
Watson, 2001), indigenous languages of South America (Nuckolls,
1996), and Balto-Finnic languages (Mikone, 2001).
In addition to more direct acoustic links, these iconic, sound- 
symbolic mappings evoke sensory, motor, or affective experiences 
or characterize aspects of the spatio-temporal unfolding of an 
event. In fact, the majority of sound-symbolic words refer to events 
or states in which sound is not essential. That is, properties of 
experiences -  including visual, tactile, as well as mental and emo­
tional experiences -  may systematically correspond to properties 
of vowels and consonants, and their patterns of combination (e.g., 
reduplication) (Hamano, 1998). To give the reader some idea of the 
rich system of iconically motivated words found in many languages, 
we give examples in Table 1 of iconic ideophones from Siwu (a Kwa 
(Niger-Congo) language spoken in eastern Ghana) (Dingemanse, 
in press) and in Table 1 of iconic mimetics from Japanese (taken 
from Vigliocco and Kita, 2006).
The examples from both languages make clear the wide range of 
sensory events that can be incorporated into sound-symbolic map­
pings: visual sensations, tactile sensations, different types of motion 
events, manners of motion, physiological states, and psychologi­
cal states. The examples also make clear that there are systematic 
form-meaning correspondences in these words that make use of 
what has been referred to as Gestalt iconicity (Bühler, 1934; see also 
Dingemanse, in press): the structure of the word can be structurally 
iconic of the spatio-temporal structure of an event. For example, in 
both Siwu and Japanese, the full reduplication of syllables maps onto 
events that are iterated or distributed. In Siwu, in particular, unitary 
events tend to be expressed with monosyllabic forms, and the addi­
tion of a lengthened vowel evokes a unitary, but durative event. In 
Japanese, in particular, the voicing of an initial consonant indicates 
the size of the object involved (as in the difference between goro and 
koro in Table 1). Such form-meaning relationships are not always 
fully productive, but are shared among many mimetic words.
The inventories of sound-symbolic lexical forms in languages 
which have them are typically substantial. One dictionary of 
Japanese mimetic words lists more than 1,700 entries (Atoda and 
Hoshino, 1995). As should be evident from the examples above, 
mimetic words cannot be considered to be an isolated phenomenon
Table 1 | Examples of sound-symbolism in S iw u and Japanese.
Meaning
S iw u  ìd e o p h o n ìc  w o r d
kpebebee rigid posture of a muscular person
kpDtDr>KpDtDn the jerky walk of a turtle
gidigidi running energetically
ny£m£r£-ny£m£r£ slithering movement
ts3kw£-tsDkw£ sawing movement
biribiri sowed at close intervals
müny£müny£ sparkling light
saaa cool sensation
Yiii the roaring feeling of vertigo
Yààà flowing quietly without obstruction
käää looking attentively
dzâ sudden appearance
wäi bright flash
wùrùfùù fluffy texture
tsarara the fluidity of a liquid
substance (e.g., palm oil)
JA P A N E S E  M iM ET ic w o r d
goro heavy object rolling
koro light object rolling
poto thin/little liquid hitting
a solid surface
boto thick/much liquid hitting
a solid surface
gorogoro a heavy object rolling repeatedly
korokoro a light object rolling repeatedly
nurunuru the tactile sensation caused
by slimy substance
pika a flash of light
pyon a swift jump
yochiyochi the manner of walking
typical for infants
tobotobo a sluggish manner of walking
tekuteku a brisk manner of walking
kutakuta a state of fatigue
sowasowa the restless anxiety before an
important event
in these languages (as one may argue regarding onomatopoeia in 
languages such as English or Italian). Sound-symbolic, iconic 
words play an integral part in the language as adverbials, predica­
tive nominals, verbs, and adjectives. They are used frequently in 
everyday conversation, and are especially frequent in narratives and 
story-telling, to help bring to life events through vivid depiction 
and enactment. In Japanese, they are used in many different forms 
of established verbal arts (Schourup, 1993), from comic books to 
novels by Nobel-Prize winning authors.
The inventories of such iconic forms in individual languages are, 
of course, conventionalized within each language, yet there exist what 
seem to be universal tendencies in the types of mappings that occur 
across languages. For example, as discussed further in the Section “Are 
we Sensitive to Iconicity?,” back vowels and voiced consonants tend to 
evoke large, heavy, and more rounded things, while front vowels and
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voiceless consonants evoke smaller, more jagged things (Köhler, 1929; 
Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001 ). This universality may be due to 
the origin of sound-symbolism in imitative connections between the 
shape of the mouth (producing sounds) and the shape of real-world 
entities (the denotata of the sounds), as well as possibly a reflection of 
(imitative) kinesic muscle activity triggered by certain events/actions 
(Foroni and Semin, 2009). Evidence that such universality may be 
rooted in our biology also comes from animal ethology. Ohala (1984) 
discusses the relationship between the impression of physical size and 
vocal tract size. A larger, longer vocal tract produces lower resonances 
(like back vowels), which implies an animal of a larger size. Conversely, 
the higher resonances (like front vowels) of a smaller, shorter vocal 
tract are associated with a smaller animal.
ic o n ic it y  in  s ig n e d  l a n g u a g e
Signed languages, produced and perceived in the visual-spatial 
modality, obey the same grammatical constraints and linguistic 
principles found in spoken languages (for reviews, see Emmorey, 
2002; Sandler and Lillo-Martin, 2006). The visual nature of the 
modality, however, results in an abundance of direct iconic, visual- 
to-visual mappings. Much of what we communicate about is visu­
ally perceived (e.g., where things are, where they are going, how 
they are interacting, and what they look like), and the visual-spatial 
modality affords a visually iconic depiction of such information 
through the placement of the hands (as primary articulators) in 
the space in front of the body (i.e., the signing space).
At the phonological level, any one sign is made up of features 
from three main parameters: the shape of the hands (handshape), 
the location of the hands in space or on the body (location), and the 
movement of the hands (movement). Iconicity may, but need not 
be, present in one or more of these parameters. While many signs 
exhibit iconicity, as the modality exploits the potential for visual iconic 
mappings, there are also signs which we may consider to be fully arbi­
trary, where a visual motivation for the form-meaning mapping is not 
apparent. Most signs, in fact, exhibit both iconic and arbitrary features, 
and the degree of iconicity or arbitrariness ascribed to individual signs 
is best understood as a continuum. Examples of iconic and non-iconic 
signs in British Sign Language (BSL) are given in Figures 1A-D below. 
The iconic sign for cry (in Figure 1A) is made with two extended index 
fingers (handshape), which move in an alternating pattern downward 
from the eyes (movement) on the signer’s face (location). The sign 
visually depicts the path of tears as they fall. In the BSL sign meaning 
aeroplane (in Figure 1B), the extended thumb and pinky visually 
depict an aeroplane’s wings, and the movement of the hand high 
in space in a straight trajectory depicts the path motion of flying. 
Conversely, there is no iconic mapping between form and meaning 
for the BSL signs for battery and afternoon (Figures 1C,D).
Similarly to the Gestalt iconic correspondences discussed for spo­
ken language above, where the nature of an event can be reflected in 
the morphophonological structure of the word, sign forms can also 
be modified to reflect the spatio-temporal structure of events. For 
example, in the sign forms, like in the spoken word forms, reduplicated 
movement patterns indicate iteration or continuation, with the type of 
reduplication (e.g., short, punctuated vs. smooth, continuous repeti­
tions) providing additional information. Such modifications can be 
used to indicate aspectual information, or mark plurals (see Figure 2; 
Klima and Bellugi, 1979). Their iconic, motivated character is identi-
FIGüRE 1 | Examples of iconic signs meaning cry (a) and aeropiane 
(B) and non-iconic signs meaning battery (C) and afternoon (D) in BSL.
fied more clearly in Wilbur’s (2003, 2009) elaboration of the Event 
Visibility Hypothesis. Specifically, Wilbur argues that the semantics of 
an event type (e.g., telic or atelic) is manifest in the morphophonologi­
cal form of predicate signs (e.g., continuative or durative aspectual 
marking is possible only for atelic events, and not for telic events). 
Moreover, Wilbur argues that the relationship between the meaningful 
(movement) components of predicates (e.g., hold, continuous) and 
their phonological form is motivated in that the mapping is derived 
from semantic-perceptual properties of events and relies on principles 
available from physics of motion and spatial geometry.
Similar to the examples of onomatopoetic and sound-symbolic 
words from spoken languages above, iconic form-meaning map­
pings in sign languages are created from the representation of only 
certain salient features of real-world objects or events, and there 
can be several choices about how to iconically represent any one 
concept. The same referent can thus be represented in different ways 
in different languages. For example, the BSL sign for lion iconically 
represents a lion’s pouncing paws, while the American Sign Language 
(ASL) sign for lion iconically represents the mane. Moreover, dif­
ferent sign languages may iconically represent the same feature of a 
real-world referent, but may do so in phonologically different ways. 
For example, the ASL and BSL signs meaning cat both represent the 
whiskers of a cat, but use different handshapes to do so. In the ASL 
sign (shown in Figure 3A), the pinched index finger and thumb 
trace a single cat whisker. In the BSL sign (shown in Figure 3B), the 
spread fingers visually depict and trace all of the whiskers.
Most sign languages further use a system of predicates with 
which the location, motion, and action of entities can be iconically/ 
topographically represented in sign space. In these so-called “clas­
sifier predicates,” the handshape represents a referent (by depicting 
certain of its salient visuospatial properties or its manipulation) 
and the location and motion of the hands in sign space represents 
the location and motion of referents.
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FIGü RE 2 | Different forms of iconically-motivated ASL aspectual morphemes (durational, continual and exhaustive) both singly (B, C) and in combination 
(D- F). Picture (A) indicates the uninflected form. Reprinted with permission from Poizner et al. (1987).
ASL cat BSL cat
FIGüRE 3 | The signs meaning cat in ASL (A) and BSL (B).
Thus, whereas in spoken languages the existence of lexical 
and sentential iconicity can be called into question, this is not 
the case across sign languages, given that iconicity is so abun­
dantly represented within any one language as well as across all 
signed languages researched to date. Despite this fact, however, 
early sign language research argued strongly against a role for 
iconicity in language learning and language use. One initial force 
driving the dismissal of iconicity was the attempt to disprove the 
popular notion that sign languages were not true languages, but 
merely gestural, pantomimic systems of communication. Since 
arbitrariness of the sign is taken to be a basic tenet of language, 
evidence was amassed that demonstrated that the iconicity 
apparent in the surface form of signs was not important to the 
language. Concerning language change, for example, Frishberg 
(1975) concluded that iconicity erodes over time and iconic 
forms become arbitrary. Although Klima and Bellugi (1979) 
discuss the “coexistence of the iconic and arbitrary face of signs” 
(p. 28) at length, they similarly stress that the iconic aspects of 
signs are often inaccessible, in the sense that they cannot be
identified above chance by naïve non-signers. Moreover, they 
stress that signs consist of formational (phonological) features 
that are themselves meaningless and that combine according to 
a rule-governed system to make lexical signs in which iconicity 
does not take part.
However, iconicity has not been completely ignored in sign lan­
guage research. Particularly in the realm of phonology, researchers 
have recognized the potential role that iconicity plays in the for­
mation of signed languages. Mandel writes, “An adequate account 
of (American) Sign Language must include the fact that the form 
various elements take in the language depends in part on the visual 
appearance of their referents” (Mandel, 1977, p. 57). In the litera­
ture, one can find thorough treatments of the rates and types of 
iconicity found in various signed languages (Pizzuto and Volterra, 
2000; Taub, 2001; Pietrandrea, 2002). Several phonological models 
suggest that iconic properties of signs must be treated differently 
than unmotivated aspects of form (Friedman, 1976; van der Kooij, 
2002). Boyes-Braem (1981) proposed a lexical model that takes 
semantically motivated elements of a sign into account. In her 
analysis of ASL handshapes, she argued for an extra symbolic level 
in addition to those levels present in spoken languages, which would 
include iconically motivated handshapes, thus showing the impor­
tance of iconicity in the formation of signs. Friedman (1976), in 
looking at sign locations (again in ASL), also suggested that iconic 
locations be given special status. Under her analysis, iconic loca­
tions were treated as allophonic variations of a single phonemic 
location. The idea of treating iconic features of a sign as existing 
outside the realm of the phonology is also taken up in van der Kooij
(2002), who, in an attempt to constrain the phonology for Sign 
Language of the Netherlands, determined that any form element 
that makes a lexical contrast simply because it carries meaning 
should be excluded from the phonological system and viewed rather 
as a semantically motivated phonetic realization of a phonological
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object. Under these accounts, iconic features of a sign are seen to 
have a more direct and presumably different link to meaning than 
unmotivated aspects of form.
Along similar lines, Semantic Phonology Theory (Stokoe, 1991; 
Armstrong et al., 1995) proposes that the phonological composi­
tion of a sign is meaningful, such that a sign’s meaning is par­
tially predicted by its phonology and vice versa. Here, meaning 
is reflected in the phonological parameters of signs (hand con­
figuration, movement, and place of articulation of signs) because 
they are grounded in and shaped by our cognitive and perceptual 
experience. Though this theory challenges the idea of the “duality 
of patterning” considered to be essential to language, there is clear 
evidence for separate levels of semantic and phonological infor­
mation (i.e., a tip-of-the-finger state akin to the tip-of-the-tongue 
experience in which there is access to semantic information but 
not phonological information, Thompson et al., 2005). The role of 
iconicity has further received attention for its potential in shaping 
language structure and discourse in signed languages (Cuxac, 1999; 
Taub, 2001; Sallandre and Cuxac, 2002; Wilcox, 2004). Nonetheless, 
in terms of processing or language acquisition, the role of iconicity 
has been strongly argued against, based on what might appear to 
be very limited evidence, as we will discuss below in the Section 
“Sensitivity in Signed Languages.”
ARE w e  SENSITivE TO ICONICITY? 
sensitivity in spoken languages
Until recently, iconic form-meaning mappings have been consid­
ered uninformative about our understanding of what “language” 
is and, therefore, not worth serious consideration and empirical 
investigation. As discussed above, this viewpoint comes from both 
an historical-typological perspective (i.e., maintaining the idea of 
arbitrariness as the only fundamental feature of language, result­
ing in part from a focus on languages with very sparse iconic form 
inventories) and a processing stance which assumes that iconic 
mappings are so sparse in spoken languages that the system 
would not likely make use of them during processing. However, 
and despite this, there remains a rich history of investigation into 
the occurrence and generality of iconic form-meaning mappings. 
Some of this investigation stems from a desire to understand the 
origins of language, with iconic form-meaning mappings consid­
ered to be one possible and logical entry into the language system 
(Armstrong, 1983).
In line with this, Köhler (1929) was the first to show that speakers 
tend to match certain speech sounds to certain shapes. He found 
that speakers of Spanish reliably judged takete to be best associated 
with a jagged-edge shape and baluba to be best associated with a 
round, curvy shape. Similar results have been reported with speak­
ers of different languages. For example, in a more recent study, 
Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) asked monolingual speakers 
of English and Tamil “Which of these shapes is bouba and which is 
kiki?” Across both language groups, approximately 95% selected the 
curvy shape as bouba and the jagged one as kiki. These findings sug­
gest that judgments are not tied to a particular language, but rather 
reflect sensitivity that is more universal in nature. Ramachandran 
and Hubbard (2001) argue that the “kiki/bouba effect” has implica­
tions for the evolution of language, since the naming of objects is not 
necessarily arbitrary. They point out a physical relationship between
the shape of the mouth and the shape of objects being described. 
The rounded shape is more commonly labeled bouba likely because 
of the corresponding roundness of the mouth that occurs when 
producing the word. For the sharp, pointed kiki shape a matching 
tense mouth pattern produces the /i/ sound, and additionally the /k/ 
is harder and more forceful than a /b/. Ramachandran and Hubbard 
suggest that the human brain creates these cross-modal mappings 
(i.e., an initial rounded mouth representing a rounded visual shape 
gets linked to particular sound pattern) in a way akin to synesthesia 
(in which stimulation of one sensory modality leads automatically 
to the evocation of experience in a second modality, as in the case 
of consistently seeing a number with a specific color), and that this 
cross-modal priming occurs through cortical connections among 
proximal cortical areas.
Along similar lines, other experiments have demonstrated 
participants’ ability to label objects at an above-chance level 
using foreign (unknown) words (e.g., for South Malaita, Kiwai, 
Tongan, Finnish, and English: Gebels, 1969; Hebrew and English: 
Brackbill and Little, 1957; Japanese and English: Imai et al., 2008). 
In one study, for example, Brown et al. (1955) translated English 
antonym pairs into Chinese, Czech, and Hindi and asked English 
speakers to match them to the English translations provided. 
Not only were subjects above chance in making correct matches, 
there was also high agreement within the speaker groups. This 
is consistent with the Sapir (1929) finding that English speakers 
show high levels of agreement in making comparative judgments 
between non-word pairs, e.g., in judging mal to be larger than 
mil. Brown et al. likewise speculate that speech may have origi­
nated from imitative connections between sounds and meaning, 
thus explaining their apparent universality. More recently, Imai 
et al. (2008) found that both Japanese and English speakers made 
similar judgments on novel, but possible Japanese verbs, when 
judging whether or not they were iconic of particular actions. 
This finding emerged despite Japanese-speaking subjects’ knowl­
edge of mimetic words in their language and English-speaking 
subjects’ ignorance of it. These findings lead Imai et al. to sug­
gest that certain aspects of sound-symbolism are universally and 
biologically grounded. Similarly, Nygaard et al. (2009) found that 
sound-symbolic mappings facilitate word learning and process­
ing cross-linguistically. Three groups of English speakers learned 
to associate Japanese words with an English translation word. 
One group learned the correct English translation equivalent, 
another group learned the translation equivalent of the Japanese 
word’s antonym, and the last group learned an unrelated transla­
tion word. Participants were subsequently asked to listen to the 
Japanese words and to pick the translation they had learned from 
two visually presented English words. The authors found that 
English speakers were faster to respond to Japanese words that 
had been learned with the correct English translation equivalent 
than those that had been paired with an unrelated English word. 
Moreover, the authors found a slight processing advantage for 
Japanese words paired with an antonym translation equivalent, 
which indicates that the effect may hold within conceptual/ 
semantic domains. These findings suggest that sound-symbolic 
mappings are not arbitrary and language-specific, but rather 
reflect some more general phenomenon which extends cross- 
linguistically.
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Iconic mappings in spoken languages further seem to be more 
resistant to regular sound changes. Joseph (1987) gives the example 
of the onomatopoetic interpretation of a cuckoo’s call, which dia- 
chronically has related forms, or cognates, in several Indo-European 
languages, all of which resemble the English word, cuckoo (i.e., 
Ancient Greek, Latin, Sanskrit and English). These cognates of 
cuckoo all failed to undergo an aspect of Grimm’s Law: namely 
the shift of voiceless stops to voiceless fricatives. The failure of these 
words to shift into something like /huhu/ is likely due to the closer 
link between the /k/ sound and the actual sound a cuckoo bird 
makes. Thus, there is evidence that languages conspire to preserve 
iconic form-meaning mappings.
Overall, considering judgments, there is clear evidence that 
speakers are sensitive to iconic form-meaning mappings. However, 
judgments are a rather indirect measure of language use, being 
off-line and susceptible to metacognitive strategies. More critical 
evidence for humans’ sensitivity to iconic mapping must come 
from on-line studies of language processing that show that iconicity 
affects lexical processes.
To date, there have been only a few experiments addressing 
the potential impact of iconicity in spoken language processing. 
It would seem that in this area, particularly, widely held beliefs 
about arbitrariness as a defining feature of language, and iconicity, 
conversely, as a trivial and almost paralinguistic feature, have likely 
hindered investigation. Nevertheless, what work has been done is 
suggestive. The results of initial research using off-line judgment 
tasks (discussed above) are indicative of the idea that common 
patterns of sound-symbolism should predict language-processing 
consequences. Specifically, there may be processing benefits (both in 
comprehension and production) for words that map more directly 
onto our perceptual and motor experiences of the world. There 
may also be benefits in terms of bootstrapping into the language 
system, a possibility discussed below.
Regular mappings between form and meaning have been 
shown to have a processing consequence in lexical decision tasks. 
Specifically, Bergen (2004) used lexical priming to investigate the 
role of regular form-meaning correspondences found for phon- 
esthemes (e.g., /gl/ as in glint, glitter, glow, glare). Bergen found that 
these mappings sped lexical access over and above pure phonologi­
cal or semantic priming alone, indicating a processing advantage 
for these form-meaning mappings. However, one must be careful 
in the case of phonesthemes as it is not completely clear whether 
the processing benefit derives from regularity or iconicity of form- 
meaning mappings. Specifically, priming from regular repeated 
phonesthemes like gl- and -ash may simply be a form of repetition- 
based priming1. However, while clearly less representational, there 
is some evidence that speakers are sensitive to iconic aspects of 
these form-meaning mappings (see Bolinger, 1950; Jakobson and 
Waugh, 1979).
Of more relevance to our discussion are studies showing a process­
ing effect between more clearly meaningful mappings. Westbury 
(2005) manipulated words (with either stops or continuants)
1Phonesthemes are not generally considered to be morphemes because of their 
non-compositional nature. Specifically, they do not join with other full morphemes 
to make up words (e.g., if you remove the gl- from glow the remaining -ow cannot 
stand alone).
presented in frames (black backgrounds with a white angular or 
rounded shape cut out of the middle). Subjects saw a string of let­
ters or a single letter/number in the middle of the frame and were 
asked to decide as quickly and accurately as possible whether a letter 
string was word (Experiment 1) or a single character was a letter 
(Experiment 2). Continuants (e.g., /m/, /n/) were recognized faster 
in a curvy frame, while stops (e.g., /p/, /k/) were recognized faster in 
a spiky frame, but the finding only held for non-words in the first 
experiment. Experiment 2 showed that the word-frame matching 
effect in Experiment 1 could not be due to shape matching of the 
letters and the cut-out shape as there was no interaction of letter 
shape and frame shape.
If iconic mappings are common across languages and cultures, 
there may be some basic predisposition to mapping properties of 
visual objects and actions in the environment to specific acoustic 
properties. Shintel et al. (2006) looked at analog acoustic expres­
sion or “spoken gesture” to convey meaning related to direction of 
motion and speed of motion. Speakers describing the direction of 
motion of a dot on a computer screen reliably used a higher pitch 
for an upward moving dot (“It is going up” ) than for a downward 
moving dot (“It is going down”). A significant difference in pitch was 
also found when participants simply read the descriptive sentences 
(presented on a screen) aloud. In a second experiment, the authors 
investigated whether the speed of object motion correlates with 
speaking rate (an analog acoustic modulation). Speakers described 
dots moving horizontally across a screen as “It is going left” or “It is 
going right.” Crucially, the dots moved at different speeds (fast or 
slow), but speakers were instructed to describe only the direction 
of motion. Another group of participants was asked to listen to the 
recorded sentences and to judge the speed of the dots described 
in them. The results showed that both speakers and listeners used 
speaking rate to convey/comprehend information about an event, 
independent of the semantics of the lexical items. Speakers used a 
faster speaking rate to describe fast-moving dots than to describe 
slow-moving ones; and listeners could reliably guess the speed of 
the dot being described (although the descriptions themselves only 
encoded the direction of motion).
Thus, although limited in number, there is indeed some clear indi­
cation that iconicity affects spoken language processing. Showing 
that adult language users are sensitive to iconic form-meaning map­
pings begs the question of how these effects come about in develop­
ment, and whether or not iconicity helps vocabulary learning.
Along similar lines to the Shintel et al. study, Walker et al. (2010) 
examined preferential looking patterns for infants and found that 
infants looked longer at a changing visual display (an animated 
bouncing ball) when it was accompanied by a sound (a sliding whis­
tle) with a congruent pitch (high pitch for high location changing 
to low pitch for low location), when compared to incongruent pitch 
and spatial location. Thus Walker et al. provide evidence that even 
3- to 4-month-old infants are sensitive to iconic mappings, thus 
addressing the question of whether or not these mappings must 
be learned or not. This finding suggests that these visual-auditory 
mappings are an unlearned aspect of perceptual cognition that may 
be the basis of form-meaning correspondences in language.
The role of prosody or intonational contours in early language 
development has been linked to characteristic vocalization patterns 
in infant directed speech (IDS), through which caregivers regularly
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convey specific communicative intentions like approval, praise, or 
warning (Fernald, 1989). In adult speech, prosody has traditionally 
been assumed to play a role in structural parsing, as a conduit for 
affective content and other aspects of communicative intention, but 
crucially, has not been assumed to be linked to word meaning in any 
way. However, Nygaard et al. (2009) have shown that speakers use 
prosody to process word meaning, and that certain conceptuo-se- 
mantic domains may have specific prosodic correlates. Participants 
heard novel words recorded with IDS-like prosody corresponding 
to different semantic dimensions (e.g., happy/sad, big/small, hot/ 
cold). When shown pictures depicting each pole of antonym pairs 
(e.g., a happy person and a sad person) and asked to pick the one 
referred to by the novel word (e.g., “Can you get the seebow one?”), 
participants were able to do so by relying on domain-specific pro­
sodic correlates to meaning2. Importantly, when IDS-like prosodic 
contours were mismatched with semantic dimension (e.g., prosody 
for happy/sad occurring with pictures depicting hot/cold) partici­
pants were significantly poorer at picking the correct picture. This 
indicates that participants were not simply using prosody to cue 
valence, but rather that prosody does in fact convey meaningful 
information linked to specific semantic domains.
In a study more directly linked to iconicity encoded in the lexi­
con, Kovic et al. (2010) used both behavioral and electrophysiologi- 
cal measures to show that iconicity affects learning in adults. Kovic 
et al. used an implicit learning categorization task in which subjects 
learnt word/picture mappings implicitly (by making guesses and 
receiving feedback) and were then tested on these mappings. The 
pictures consisted of animal-like figures whose four prominent 
features (head, tail, legs, wings) were variously either rounded or 
pointed, and the words (i.e., the figure labels) were chosen accord­
ing to sound-symbolic mappings with the figures (mot for round­
edness and riff for pointedness). Participants, assigned to either a 
congruent (i.e., round figures with mot) or incongruent condition 
(i.e., round figures with riff) in a training phase, were subsequently 
(in the testing phase) faster to confirm and slower to reject sound- 
symbolically congruent label-figure associations. Moreover, using 
event related potentials, an early negativity (N-200) was found 
for iconic mappings between the object and the label it was given 
when compared to mappings that were not iconic. Along the same 
lines as Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001), Kovic et al. (2010) 
conclude that the sensitivity to sound-symbolic (iconic) label-figure 
associations may reflect a more general process of auditory-visual 
feature integration where properties of auditory stimuli facilitate 
a mapping to specific visual features.
Specific to children, Maurer et al. (2006) found that 2.5-year- 
olds were sensitive to “kiki/bouba” correspondences. Children 
consistently matched words with rounded vowels to round shapes 
and words with unrounded vowels to the pointed shapes more 
frequently than the other way around and there was no difference 
between children performing this task compared to adults per­
forming the same task. That even young children are sensitive to 
these mappings in a language context further suggests their role in 
language development. Some aspects of iconic mappings between
2The speakers asked to produce the novel words with IDS-like prosody correspon­
ding to the relevant semantic dimensions (“happy/sad,” “big/small” etc.) produced 
consistent and reliable prosodic contours in association with these meanings.
concepts and phonology have indeed been linked to facilitated 
learning. Imai et al. (2008) created novel verbs that were iconic 
(sound-symbolic) of particular actions, and other novel verbs that 
were not. They then used these novel verbs in a learning task with 
3-year-old Japanese-speaking children. The children showed an 
advantage in learning the novel sound-symbolic (iconic) words, 
compared to the novel words that were not sound-symbolic, 
suggesting that regular mappings facilitate early language devel­
opment. In line with this idea, it has been shown that Japanese 
children tend to learn iconic words very early on (Maeda and 
Maeda, 1983).
Below we move to a discussion of studies addressing sign 
languages, beginning with studies using off-line measures of 
subjects’ sensitivity to iconic mapping, then moving to stud­
ies using on-line measures, and finishing with studies assessing 
language acquisition.
se n s it iv it y  in  s ig n e d  la n g u a g es
In terms of sign language research, it might be surprising that 
despite the pervasiveness of iconicity at the sign (word) level there 
is almost no research investigating the degree to which signers are 
sensitive to iconic properties of a sign. Signers are clearly aware of 
iconicity, making use of it in areas such as poetry and word play 
(Sutton-Spence, 2005; this is also seen in spoken languages; see the 
book series: Iconicity in Language and Literature, volumes 1-9, for 
a multitude of examples). Further, iconicity ratings have been col­
lected for several sign languages (e.g., for BSL: Vinson et al., 2008; 
for ASL: Griffith et al., 1981; for ASL and DGS, Adam et al., 2007), 
suggesting that signers are aware of iconicity in their language and 
are able to make judgments about it.
In a first study investigating possible consequences of iconic 
mappings in BSL,Vigliocco et al. (2005), showed an effect of iconic­
ity in a similarity judgment task. They found that native BSL signers 
and English speakers differed in their judgments when grouping 
signs/words according to meaning similarity. In BSL, signs referring 
to tools (e.g., knife) and tool-actions (e.g., to cut) share “tool-use” 
iconicity. Vigliocco et al. (2005) found that, while English speak­
ers tended to group tool-actions along with body actions (e.g., to 
hit), thereby preferring to distinguish actions from objects (and 
preserving a grammatical distinction between nouns and verbs), 
BSL signers tended to group tools and tool-actions together, as 
predicted on the basis of shared iconic properties of the signs.
Vigliocco et al. account for the findings in terms of the men­
tal images triggered by the iconic signs. In support of this, when 
English-speaking non-signers were instructed to create a mental 
image evoking typical experiences with the object or action, they 
behaved like the signers, judging tool-actions to be more similar to 
tools, compared to the speakers to whom no imagery instructions 
were given. From this we can conclude that language users (spoken 
or signed) are aware of iconicity and make use of it as part of their 
meta-linguistic language-processing strategy. Given this, it becomes 
a natural progression to address what, if any, is the role of iconicity 
in on-line language processing.
Our recent research has provided the first evidence for a clear 
role of iconicity in on-line language processing. In a first study, 
using picture/sign matching with ASL, Thompson et al. (2009) 
found that strong relationships between iconic properties of a
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sign and features of a pictured object speeded sign recognition 
for signers. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate by 
button-press whether a picture and a sign referred to the same 
object. Experimental signs were all iconic. In one condition, the 
iconic property/feature of the sign (e.g., BIRD, produced with 
thumb and forefinger at the mouth, representing a bird’s beak) 
was salient in the picture (e.g., a bird pictured from the front 
with the beak well in view) while in the second condition the 
iconic property was not salient (e.g., a picture of a bird flying 
with the extended wings well in view). As a control, English­
speaking non-signers were also presented with the same pictures 
followed by English words. ASL signers responded faster when the 
iconic property of the sign was salient in the picture than when 
it was not, while English controls showed no difference between 
conditions. This first processing study provides evidence that a 
more transparent mapping between meaning and form can aid 
language processing.
In a replication of the ASL study, Vinson et al. (submitted) like­
wise found that BSL signers’ responses in picture-sign matching 
were faster when the iconic property of a sign appeared saliently 
in the picture, while non-signers showed no benefit in matching 
such pictures to English words (replicating Thompson et al., 2009 
in a historically unrelated sign language). The Vinson et al. study 
further considered whether or not the “iconicity effect” could be 
driven by typicality of iconic properties encoded in any one sign, 
i.e., seeing a highly typical feature of an object such as the antlers 
of a deer might help signers access meaning more quickly. Based 
on English speaker-generated feature norms (McRae et al., 2005), 
Vinson et al. controlled for typicality of iconic features encoded in 
a sign. Specifically, the iconic aspect of half the signs represented 
a highly typical feature according to the McRae et al. norms (e.g., 
whiskers for cat) and the other half represented an atypical feature 
(e.g., pedals for bicycle; see Figure 4). The iconicity effect, i.e., faster 
responses and higher accuracy for more iconic signs compared 
to less iconic signs, was not modulated by feature typicality. No 
difference in response times was found for signs whose iconicity 
highlighted a salient, or more typical, aspect of its referent com­
pared to signs that made use of less salient, but nonetheless iconic 
features of a sign. The results indicate that the effect observed was 
general to all iconic signs referring to objects, rather than stemming 
from the typicality of the iconic property.
These findings establish the potential role of iconicity in lan­
guage processing, but leave unanswered the question of how these 
effects come about. One could argue, for example, that they are 
strategically linked to the task. Namely, subjects would not auto­
matically use iconicity in processing, although they would use it in 
our experiments because the task specifically required them to focus 
their attention on meaning-based relationships. The potential use of 
metacognitive, task-related strategies that favor iconicity effects was 
directly addressed in a further study in which we used a phonologi­
cal decision task, thus a task that does not require subjects to focus 
on meaning properties. Specifically, Thompson et al. (2010) asked 
BSL signers and non-signers to indicate whether a sign employed 
a straight or bent handshape (a task based on the phonological 
parameter of handshape). Despite the fact that the task did not 
require subjects to access meaning, the relative iconicity of the 
signs affected signers’ responses. As a further control, non-signers
Sign represents: HIGH feature typicality LOW feature typicality
Iconic feature is:
SALIENT 
in the picture
NOT SALIENT 
in the picture
FIGüRE 4 | Still image for BSL signs cat (upper left) and bicycle (upper 
right). Pictures reflecting the iconic property saliently appear in the middle 
panels; pictures in which the iconic property is not salient appear in the lower 
panels. The sign for cat, indicating the whiskers on a cat's face, depicts a 
typical feature, while the sign for bicycle, showing the pedals (moving in a 
circular motion) does not.
participated in the experiment, as judgments about handshape 
(form-based judgments) were possible without knowledge of a 
sign’s meaning. Importantly, iconicity effects persisted even when 
non-linguistic characteristics of the signs (e.g., differences in hand­
shape complexity or sign production time) were taken into account 
by factoring out non-signers’ performance. Interestingly, signers 
proved to be slower and less accurate to respond to iconic signs 
than to non-iconic signs. Thompson et al. (2010) suggest that the 
interference in making handshape-based decisions for iconic signs 
could stem from more automatic access to meaning for iconic than 
non-iconic signs which could serve to impair phonological-level 
decision making for iconic signs. Overall, the findings show that the 
iconic aspects of meaning inherent in phonological features of the 
sign are automatically accessed even when they are not necessary 
for a task (and, in this case, actually hinder performance).
To summarize, just as for spoken languages, there are only a few 
studies to date that directly assess iconicity effects (using off-line 
and on-line measures). Crucially, however, they suggest that iconic 
mappings in signed languages play a role in processing and are not 
simply an artifact related to specific tasks.
In terms of language development for signed languages, the 
results have been more mixed. In a recent study, Ormel et al. 
(2009) show that iconicity affects sign recognition by children aged 
10-12 years. In a picture/sign matching task similar to Thompson 
et al. (2009), pictures and signs (Sign Language of the Netherlands) 
were displayed simultaneously on a computer monitor and subjects 
were asked to decide if the picture and the sign matched. Ormel 
et al. (2009) found that responses were significantly faster (“yes, the 
picture matches the sign”) for highly iconic signs than for less iconic 
signs. However, this may not be particularly surprising given that
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by age 10, children already possess a nearly adult-like vocabulary. 
The real test is whether iconicity affects vocabulary learning for 
younger children.
Orlansky and Bonvillian (1984) provided some evidence that 
children’s earliest signs are not iconic and Meier (1982) argues that 
iconic signs are not less prone to errors (e.g., for iconically motivated 
agreement signs such as GIVE which move from source to goal). 
Thus, Meier et al. (2008) found that sign errors produced during a 
longitudinal study of four deaf children (from as early as 8 months 
and continuing to as late as 17 months) did not tend to be more iconic 
than the correct sign (as one might expect to see, if children were 
tuned into iconicity; Meier et al. 2008). However, several research­
ers have argued that there are effects of iconicity on child language 
acquisition. Brown (1980) showed that hearing children (average age 
4) were better at memorizing iconic signs for objects when compared 
to memorizing non-iconic signs. Brown argues that sign languages 
are easier to learn than spoken languages because of the high degree of 
iconic form-meaning mappings for these basic objects. This finding 
is consistent with adult second language learners of a signed language 
who make use of iconic properties of signs for learning (Lieberth 
and Gamble, 1991; Campbell et al., 1992). More importantly, early 
acquisition of iconic forms has been found in studies examining deaf 
children learning a signed language natively. Slobin et al. (2003), 
examined the productions of deaf children with deaf parents and 
found that iconicity promotes the early (before age 3) emergence of 
meaningful handshape distinctions, such as those found in handling 
classifiers (i.e., classifiers that depict an agent holding an object). 
Casey (2003) likewise concludes that there are effects of iconicity on 
the acquisition of ASL. Casey analyzes the naturalistic (children inter­
acting with their caregivers) longitudinal data of six deaf children 
learning ASL natively from deaf parents. Casey notes that directional 
verbs, verbs that mark agreement (by moving to locations in space 
associated with verbal arguments), emerge earlier (at ages 1;6 to 2;1) 
with verbs such as give, which map more directly onto real-world 
movement. Interestingly, Casey notes a developmental continuity 
between non-linguistic action gestures and the very similar-looking 
linguistic use of verb agreement.
Thus, the existing evidence for the role of iconicity in language 
acquisition does not provide decisive evidence for or against the early 
use of iconic form-meaning mappings. A first, and important, point 
to note here is that these studies have taken iconicity as a holistic 
concept. However, different kinds of iconic mappings may vary in 
learning difficulty. Iconicity in signs can represent the actions of a 
real-world referent (e.g., TO-HAMMER in BSL which is produced 
with a handshape used to hold a hammer, along with the back and 
forth movement of hammering; motor iconicity), the form of a 
referent (e.g., OWL in BSL indicates the owl’s large eyes; perceptual 
iconicity), or both (e.g., AIRPLANE in BSL is produced with the 
pinky and thumb extended to indicate the form of an airplane, 
and moves at head level in a straight line to indicate the action). 
Additionally, iconic properties of signs can indicate functional inter­
action with a referent (e.g., typing hands for COMPUTER) or even 
interaction with an object whose relation to the referent requires 
quite considerable world knowledge (e.g., milking hands of a cow’s 
udder for MILK). It is important for future research to tease apart 
these different types of iconicity and to assess their relative learning 
difficulty (see Meier et al., 2008 for a similar point).
Cognitive development may also play an important role in a 
child’s ability to use iconicity in the acquisition of form-meaning 
pairings. Namy et al. (2004) tested English-speaking children’s 
ability to learn action-based iconic and arbitrary gestural labels 
(e.g., a hammering gesture vs. a dropping gesture) for objects 
associated with certain actions (e.g., a hammer). Learning fol­
lowed a U-shaped trajectory with respect to the acquisition 
of arbitrary labels. At 18 months and again at 4 years of age, 
children are equally good at learning iconic and arbitrary labels 
for objects. However, at 26 months, children continue to learn 
iconic labels, but exhibit very poor learning of arbitrary labels. 
The authors argue that this decline in arbitrary symbol learn­
ing reflects a change in children’s expectations and awareness 
about the forms that object labels can take. During this period 
of reorganization -  in which regularities in the language system 
overall are being discovered -  children seem to temporarily zero 
in on iconic mappings as a mechanism by which form-meaning 
mappings may be created.
Tolar et al. (2008) tested the ability to interpret iconic signs 
(i.e., ASL signs) by hearing children (2.5-5 years old) who had no 
previous experience with sign language. Children were shown a sign 
and asked to pick the picture that matched the meaning from a set 
of four pictures. At about 3 years of age, children began to exhibit 
patterns of performance suggesting a cognitive shift whereby they 
started to become explicitly aware of iconicity as bridging between 
concept and form.
In contrast to the Namy et al. (2004) study, which used only 
action-like gestures, Tolar et al. (2008) included iconic signs 
reflecting the action associated with a referent as well as signs 
that were iconic of perceptual (i.e., static) features of referents, 
thereby providing some initial assessment of the role of motor 
vs. perceptual iconicity. They found that, across all ages, children 
were better at understanding signs depicting actions, compared 
to signs depicting perceptual features. As Tolar et al. point out, 
these results are further consistent with hearing toddlers’ gestures, 
which more frequently imitate actions done with objects than 
they depict perceptual qualities of the object.
Thus, whereas there seems to be clear evidence for a role of 
iconicity in language processing, the literature leaves open two 
alternative hypotheses concerning the role of iconicity in lan­
guage development. On one account, iconicity would come into 
the picture as mediated by cognitive development that would allow 
children to grasp the link between features of the phonology of 
their language and properties of referents in the world. Under this 
view, iconicity per se would not help initial vocabulary acquisition 
in spoken or signed language, but could boost the learning later 
on, once meta-linguistic knowledge starts to develop. A predic­
tion from this account is that we should observe a boost in the 
learning of iconic signs from a certain age, possibly around 3 (as 
suggested by Tolar et al.). On an alternative account, iconicity 
in sign language may rely on basic sensori-motor associations, 
hence iconicity effects (at least those reflecting basic motor and 
sensory-motor associations) would not be mediated by cognitive 
development and could support initial language development. 
Other types of iconicity that require more cognitive appreciation 
would come to play a role later. These two alternatives are explored 
in more detail below.
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GENERAL DIScUSSioN
To summarize our discussion in the previous sections, we have first 
shown that iconicity is a far more pervasive property of human 
languages than currently recognized: it is found in both spoken and 
signed languages and across all levels of language (i.e., syntax, mor­
phology, and phonology). In Section “Are we Sensitive to Iconicity?,” 
we have shown that the few studies which have assessed processing 
consequences of iconicity have found that iconicity does in fact 
affect processing. Moreover, a number of developmental studies 
show an advantage in learning iconic rather than arbitrary form- 
meaning mappings. The pervasiveness of iconicity in languages, 
and its role in language development (which we readily admit is 
controversial) and processing provides a challenge to the received 
view of language as an arbitrary, symbolic system. As Westbury 
states it: “Sound symbolism [Iconicity] effects challenge theories of 
language that posit encapsulated language systems that are wholly 
independent of other cognitive or sensory functions. They also 
challenge theories of language that posit encapsulated linguistic 
subfunctions, by assuming that phonology, orthography, semantics, 
and syntax are all processed quite distinctly.” (Westbury, 2005, p. 
16). We believe that this is the first important lesson we can take 
from our review.
For spoken languages, the dismissal of this pervasiveness may 
originate from the fact that language studies historically focused 
on iconically impoverished languages, such as Indo-European 
languages. Areally extensive language documentation, of course, 
requires resources for long-distance travel and prolonged stays in 
the “field.” In addition, comprehensive and fully representative lan­
guage documentation (certainly for signed, but also for spoken lan­
guage) has been greatly facilitated, or even made possible, through 
recent technological advances in video recording and archiving. For 
sign languages, pervasiveness of iconic expression is the rule, and 
one can speculate that if research on language had started with sign 
languages, the picture would look quite different -  iconicity, rather 
than arbitrariness, would be heralded as the fundamental feature 
of linguistic forms. As an additional crucial consideration, research 
has thus far focused primarily on language in both modalities as 
being unimodal (i.e., the vocal modality for spoken language and 
the manual modality for signed language), rather than viewing 
language as a complex multichannel communicative system. As a 
result, other iconic forms accompanying speech or sign are often 
ignored or considered to be largely epiphenomenal.
THE RoLE of Gestu r a l  FoRMS IN coMMUNicATioN
If we consider language as a complex of linguistic-discrete and 
imagistic-analog (or gestural) elements (McNeill, 1992; Okrent,
2002), we can make an even stronger case for a clear role of iconic­
ity. Even speakers of iconically poor languages make abundant use 
of iconic links in their co-speech gestures. Co-speech gestures are 
tightly integrated with speech, both semantically and temporally, 
and often iconically represent aspects of the meaning being linguis­
tically conveyed in speech. It has been shown that gestures enhance 
comprehension through mutual interaction and automatic inte­
gration with information from the speech channel (Chu and Kita, 
2008; Kelly et al., 2010). From an embodiment perspective, gestures 
have been argued to be manifestations of the simulations of action 
and perceptual imagery that are involved in language production
and comprehension (Hostetter and Alibali, 2008, 2010). In addition, 
as we have seen, the speech signal itself may also be gradiently (or 
gesturally) modulated in order to convey information related to 
the meaning of objects and events. Through “spoken gesture” -  or 
analog acoustic expression -  visual-spatial information in the world 
(e.g., speed of motion or direction of motion) can be encoded 
acoustically as modulations of pitch and speaking rate (Shintel 
et al., 2006). Similarly, prosodic variations in pitch and amplitude 
can convey information related to specific semantic domains (e.g., 
big/small, hot/cold) (Nygaard et al., 2009).
Signed languages, in addition to the iconic potential of the manu­
ally produced signs themselves, also exhibit regular and systematic 
use of iconicity in the non-manual features that accompany many 
signs. Through the use of “mouth gestures,” together with modula­
tions of the face and eyes, signers can convey additional informa­
tion about visual-spatial features of objects and events, as well as 
about affect and stance (Sandler, 2009). Visual-spatial information 
that can be expressed gesturally in this way includes size and shape 
attributes (e.g., puffed cheeks and rounded lips for roundness), rela­
tional meanings (e.g., lightly pressed together, elongated lips and 
squinted eyes for narrow), and information about manner and path 
of motion (e.g., repeated puffing of cheeks and parting of lips for 
bumpy). Sign languages display a further correspondence between 
the mouth and the hands in what is called “echo phonology” (Woll 
and Sieratzki, 1998). Here, certain properties of the manual move­
ments of signs are reflected, or echoed, in oral components. For 
example, a separation of the hands or fingers may be accompanied 
by [pa], which involves a similar separation of the lips; while an 
oscillatory movement of the fingers or hands (as in the slight back 
and forth movement of the fists in the BSL sign meaning not yet) is 
accompanied by [shhh], an oral echo of the manual oscillation.
In this broader perspective, not only is the presence and prevalence 
of iconicity not surprising, but crucially it opens up new lines of 
investigation concerning how language builds upon and necessitates 
the involvement of other cognitive systems. To date, there exists a 
substantial literature on different aspects of iconicity (as our overview 
in the Section “Iconicity in Languages: Is it Really There?” suggests). 
However, what has until very recently been missing is the recognition 
of iconicity as a basic principle guiding language use. Below we make 
an initial proposal of why it should be considered as such.
icoNiciTY AS A FoUNDATioNAL DIMENSioN of LANGUAGE
On the basis of the review above, we argue that any viable theory of 
language use must include iconicity in addition to arbitrariness as a 
guiding principle (at both the ontogenetic and phylogenetic level). 
We are not arguing, in fact, that we should completely abandon 
the idea of arbitrariness as a property of human language. This 
would obviously be incorrect, given the high frequency of arbi­
trariness in lexical representation, and indeed, its preponderance 
as compared to iconic mappings in many (families of) spoken 
languages. Rather, we would like to argue that both iconicity and 
arbitrariness are general principles of language, which both rep­
resent adaptation of specific languages to two fundamental con­
straints driving the phylogenesis and ontogenesis of the language 
system. These two fundamental constraints are the need to ensure 
an effective linguistic signal and the need to link linguistic form 
to human experience.
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The need to ensure an effective linguistic signal would favor 
arbitrariness. At the lexical level, for example, it has been argued that 
arbitrariness is an important design feature because it allows for 
maximum discrimination between entries in a lexicon (Monaghan 
and Christiansen, 2006) and thus allows for larger lexica to develop 
(Gasser, 2004). As such, arbitrariness plays an important role in 
terms of advantages to the language system, allowing a larger lexi­
con as well as increased communicative success (imagine how com­
municative effectiveness might be adversely affected if all things 
within a particular semantic domain, e.g., tools, were phonologi­
cally similar). Along similar lines, Gasser (2004) and Haiman (1980, 
1985) note that the degree of motivation (or iconicity) in a language 
varies inversely with the size of its basic vocabulary. This is evident, 
for example, in restricted registers (e.g., used in mourning or with 
elders) and in pidgin languages. In pidgin languages, the relation­
ship between antonym pairs is often morphologically transparent 
(i.e., iconic) rather than opaque, as in New Guinea Pidgin gutpela 
(good) vs. no + gutpela (bad) (Haiman, 1985, p. 231). In mak­
ing this claim, Haiman pits the opposing forces of iconicity and 
economy against each other. As frequency of use increases, the 
need for economy and effectiveness of form drives down the use of 
periphrastic (i.e., definition-like, and therefore more transparent) 
expressions to denote concepts. This results in lexical elaboration, 
that is, in an increase in vocabulary size, as well as in overall opacity 
of lexical and grammatical contrasts. Like Haiman, we recognize the 
interaction of different constraints. We are not denying here that 
the need to ensure effectiveness of the linguistic signal drives the 
system. However, we argue that this is not the only constraint.
The second constraint, namely the need to link linguistic form to 
human experience, would favor iconicity. The importance of link­
ing linguistic form and human experience is central to embodied 
views of language and cognition (and has long been advocated by 
functionalist approaches to language, e.g., Bates and MacWhinney, 
1982). According to embodiment theory, language comprehen­
sion, for example, requires mentally re-enacting, or simulating, the 
specific embodied experience (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou et al.,
2003). Despite ongoing debates concerning the extent to which this 
re-enactment requires the same low-level systems used in perception 
and action (see, e.g., Meteyard and Vigliocco, 2008 for a review), 
there is strong evidence that some degree of embodiment is involved, 
indicating that language use (i.e., production, comprehension, and 
acquisition) requires that linguistic form activate the same systems 
used in perception and action. Without such activation, communi­
cation could not be successful. An important question then is how 
words come to engage motor and perceptual systems.
At the ontogenetic level, and in the limited domain of lexical rep­
resentation, for words or signs with a purely arbitrary connection to 
their meaning, one could argue that mere repeated temporal associa­
tion between a label (e.g., drink) and perception or production of the 
corresponding action could ensure that the link between linguistic 
form and sensori-motor experience becomes entrenched during 
development (using a Hebbian-like mechanism, see Pulvermüller, 
1999, or other more sophisticated co-activation type models Glenberg 
and Gallese, under review). However, this may not be the whole story. 
The pervasiveness of iconic mappings invites the hypothesis that 
iconicity may also contribute to this process by providing scaffolding 
for the cognitive system to connect linguistic form and embodied 
experience. In other words, iconicity would provide a bridge across
the “major rift” between conceptual and linguistic form. It is an open, 
empirical question whether this scaffolding is useful, or even nec­
essary, in jump-starting language development, or whether it only 
comes into play after an initial set of form-meaning associations 
are in place (developed, for example, on the basis of mere repeated 
temporal associations). In either case, we would like to argue here that 
the degree of interconnection and embodiment we observe in adult 
language processing is made possible, or at least greatly facilitated, 
by the existence of iconic form-meaning mappings.
Children and their caregivers make ample use of iconic, analog 
representation in interactive and communicative situations. For spo­
ken languages, the use of iconic forms is prevalent in the prosody of 
IDS, in the use of onomatopoeia, and in the use of spoken and manual 
gesture. All of these may bridge the gap between our experience of the 
world and our ability to communicate about it -  ultimately between 
conceptual and linguistic form -  because they are analog mappings 
linking to analog referents in the world. The analog relation to refer­
ents helps ground linguistic forms into our perceptual-motor experi­
ences of the world, giving rise to embodied language (i.e., language 
grounded in our sensori-motor experience). The idea of iconicity as 
providing a way of conveying gradient, analog information is crucial 
to our suggestion that iconicity is the scaffolding that allows our 
language/communication system to “hook up” to our experience 
of the world, and to ground this experience in our perceptual and 
motor systems. We may think of iconic (analog) forms as providing 
the necessary link to development and use of a more symbolic system, 
which utilizes discrete, arbitrary (as well as iconic) forms. What we 
perceive and experience in the world is non-discrete, continuous, 
and analog in nature. Thus, the use of representational forms of the 
same nature may be crucial in building up a communication system 
that is grounded in our experience of the world.
Phylogenetically, we may speculate that some degree of iconicity 
should be present in order to facilitate (or even render possible) the 
mapping between linguistic form and meaning. Languages, nonethe­
less, can differ greatly synchronically with regards to the extent to 
which iconicity is incorporated in phonological form, for example, 
rather than in other aspects of communication (such as co-speech 
gestures, as discussed below). The scope and significance of the large 
variability across human languages in amount of iconicity is an open 
question calling for further investigation. However, the claim we are 
putting forward regarding the role of iconicity in language evolution 
supposes that iconicity was an essential ingredient in the transforma­
tion of early forms of communicative interaction into the complex 
language systems we master today. Our claim may resonate with 
suggestions that gestural (i.e., manual gestural) communication was 
an evolutionary precursor to vocal communication (Rizzolatti and 
Arbib, 1998; Stokoe, 2001). However, in contrast to a “gesture-first” 
evolutionary path into human language, we take the position that both 
manual and vocal gesture would be necessary as a precursor to our 
developed language systems. Articulations in both channels provide 
iconic mappings that would allow the building up of a symbolic sys­
tem on the scaffolding of analog relations between representational 
forms and the world. A “gesture-first” model of language evolution is 
saddled with the burden of explaining the transition from manual to 
vocal articulation. In fact, McNeill (2005) argues that the assumption 
that language started in the manual channel and then switched to the 
vocal channel is incompatible with the evolution of language into a 
complex communication system in which linguistic (e.g., speech)
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and imagistic (e.g., co-speech gesture) components are tightly and 
inextricably integrated. That is, the tight integration of the two sys­
tems (linguistic and imagistic) synchronically suggests the connection 
has been in place from the beginning, and indeed was instrumen­
tal in jump-starting the system (McNeill, 2005). The phenomenon 
of echo phonology in sign languages lends further support to this 
notion. Phylogenetically, the tight link between the manual and vocal 
articulatory systems provides a possible mechanism for the evolu­
tionary transformation of iconic forms into arbitrary forms (Woll 
and Sieratzki, 1998). Ontogenetically, the manual and vocal systems, 
which have access to iconic, analog expression in different ways and 
to differing degrees, and which thus exhibit direct links to the world 
of experience in different ways, are used in conjunction to build up a 
representational system for the world. These correspondences facili­
tate the grounding of experience within the cognitive system.
Thus, to conclude, our review makes it clear that iconicity is 
present across spoken and signed languages and that it plays a role 
during language processing and possibly in language acquisition.
We propose that iconicity is exploited to the service of guarantee­
ing the link between linguistic form and human experience. The 
variability in the forms and amount of iconicity across languages 
indicate different manners in which languages can get the balance 
right between two basic constraints, namely the need to link lan­
guage to our experience (which would favor iconicity) and the 
need to have an efficient communication system (which would 
favor arbitrariness).
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